Building fabric efficiency is a central tenet to increasing thermal performance and decreasing carbon emissions of domestic dwellings, promoted within the UK Government Zero Carbon homes policy framework. Increasing demands in the Design and Construction of building fabric efficiencies is driven by increasing stringent regulations and standards. Yet, in reality there is increasing evidence of a 'Performance Gap' between the design intents and the as-built constructed building fabric, such that some new dwellings inherit inefficiencies from the construction process. The presence of construction issues including thermal bridging, discrepancy in 'U' values and increases in air permeability contribute to increased heat loss and carbon emissions and thereby, decreasing energy and carbon efficiency. Equally, building fabric weaknesses can also contribute to the overall building performance compliance for mandatory smoke and fire spread mitigation. This paper presents three case-studies involving independent testing and performance evaluation undertaken on social housing dwellings within South Wales, UK. The paper provides further evidence to support the rationale for standardization of diagnostic testing during the construction stages of dwellings, adding to the body of evidence for in-construction testing (iCT) developed by Cardiff Metropolitan University, to reduce instances of the performance gap and its impacts upon occupant comfort, energy costs and carbon emissions.
Introduction
This paper commences with an overview of the 'fabric-first' approach to achieving zero-carbon housing in the UK, by 2020 [1; 2]. It is discussed that there are potential issues in complying with a fabric-first approach, where there are discrepancies between designed and as-built performance; which is well documented. However, what is less well documented is anomalies in mandatory compliance testing, such as air tightness testing. There are three case studies presented, which provide empirical evidence that verification and testing of construction processes has limitations, with inconsistent test methodologies for air tightness testing and inadequate guidelines for data interpretation. It is discussed that this can potentially impact upon quality assurance, certification, building efficiency in the delivery of design intents and ultimately carbon emissions and occupant comfort.
Results from a range of test methodologies to assess the fabric-first approach to housing are discussed and illustrated, including: thermography, air tightness testing (individual and combined with smoke testing), and in-situ heat flux tests. The paper builds upon the evidential need and rationale for in-construction fabric testing as developed by Cardiff Metropolitan University and as advocated by other authors, for example; thermography studies [3] , individual air tightness testing [4] , combined with smoke tests [5] and in-situ (heat flux) testing [6] .
Fabric first approach for low carbon housing
The UK is committed to implementing 'zero carbon' standards for all new domestic buildings by 2016 [1]; based upon a 'fabric first' approach through increased and improved insulation and, reduced thermal losses by eliminating thermal bridging and increasing air tightness [2] . The performance targets of the zero carbon standard are to be implemented through progressive strengthening of the requirements of Approved Document L1A (ADL1A) 'Conservation of fuel and power in new dwellings' (ADL1A) of the UK Building Regulations [7] . This includes improvement to the Accredited Construction Detail specifications for mitigation against thermal losses [ibid] . Until 2015, the Code for Sustainable Homes (CfSH) was a critical influencing factor in creating ever-more carbon, sustainable and environmentally efficient housing, within the 2016 zero carbon target [8] . Yet to-date (2015), compliance within the building fabric efficiency requirements remain a 'weak area' within the Building Regulations [9] and undermine the UK's policy commitments. The Zero Carbon Hub Evidence Review Report [6] in identifying various issues relating to the current UK compliance methodologies and regime, were reflected in the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP), methodologies, processes and tools used to check compliance with Building Regulations ADL1A. In that As-Built SAP assessments are often not reflective of the actual built dwelling.
The Evidence Review Report highlighted building fabric performance compliance issues including but not limited to a 'tick box' culture in recording evidence for SAP calculations, such as where compliant Accredited Construction Details were not actually built on site. In the UK, local government Building Control officers have the responsibility of approving building construction, including where Accredited Construction Details are used; but testing results from the case studies presented below indicate that this is not always undertaken. In addition, to short term fixes, improvisations and poor installation of fabric due to inadequate installation guidance or design drawings not followed; without understanding the impacts in achieving thermal performance requirements assessed through air pressure testing results. The Report's [6] evidence gathering sources included InnovateUK's (formerly the Technology Strategy Board) Building Performance Evaluation (BPE) programme of which case study one [10; 11] discussed below is part of this programme completed in 2015 [12] . A further two case-studies are also presented illustrating the key performance issues as highlighted in the Zero Carbon Hub report [6] .
Case studies
The following case-studies document the fabric performance testing in dwellings across three separate housing developments, located in South Wales. The developments where constructed by a range of British and Welsh contractors. The testing was undertaken by the authors for a social housing provider in Wales; as part of their independent quality assurance service, developed in conjunction with the authors [13; 14] .
3.1
Case study one -Post-occupancy In-use building fabric performance evaluation -flat and house Case study one is a low-carbon community development of four number semi-detached houses and one maisonette constructed of 'traditional' brick-block cavity; and eight flats of timber-frame and timber clad construction [11; 14] . Both build-types are constructed as two separate terrace blocks; the houses and maisonette with an east-facing aspect and the flats south-facing; forming a gated community with a communal area. Occupied from December 2010, the development had an original design strategy of Level 3+ of the CfSH. Subsequent funding enabled upgrading of the flats, to incorporate sheep wool insulation for the exterior walls, triple glazing and photovoltaics to off-set energy-usage; thereby achieving CfSH Level 4. Photovoltaics were installed, postoccupancy in 2012 on the brick-block terrace' following additional funding.
All dwellings are electricity-only with space and water heating provided by NIBE exhaust air source heat pumps, with under-floor heating and no cooling provision. The flats are 'identical' one-bedroom single-occupancy with separate lounge, kitchen and bathroom; the brick-block houses are two and three bedroom multiple-occupancies with a typical; kitchen, lounge and shower-room on the ground floor with bedrooms and a bathroom on the firstfloor. The final design air tightness target for both build-types was 5.0m 3 /h.m 2.
Quantitative testing, thermography, in-situ heat flux and air tightness, of the building fabric within one of each building-type; timber-frame/clad flat (TF/C-F1) and brick-block house (BB-H1); indicates that the overall thermal performance of the flat construction compared to the house construction appears to be higher, corresponding with the flat achieving the higher CfSH level 4 energy requirement and as a function of a smaller exterior envelope area and reduced potential fabric issues associated with construction. Thermographic studies highlighted thermal bridging within window and external door frameworks as the only common issue within both build-types. Within the brick-block house further potential heat loss issues included construction junctions between the kitchen party wall, external cavity wall and ceiling; top and bottom corner junctions between the gable and rear external walls in the ground floor WC and wet room; party wall construction, particularly for first-floor bedrooms; non-continuity between the cavity wall insulation and the loft insulation at the front and rear eaves.
Potential thermal losses due to thermal bridging are observed to also be caused be further construction flaws, notable within build-type BB-H1. Independently determined in-situ 'U'-value results for the external wall constructions were obtained (testing observed, but not undertaken by the authors) from heat flow data at the positions identified in Table1 for build-type BB-H1. The variation exhibited is inferred to be because of potential two dimensional heat flow within the brick pier between the window and door frame, and potentially due to the window cavity closer. There were no discernible thermal irregularities detected by thermal camera at the heat flux sensor locations for both build-types; the determined 'U' values are given in Table 2 . Simultaneous Air Tightness test results conducted post-occupancy and in-use (testing observed, but not undertaken by the authors) indicates differences in the air permeability's from the original as-designed as-built test values used in the original 2010, SAP calculations for the two build-types and as described in Table 3 ; significantly for BB-H1 build type. Unwanted air leakage pathways identified through the use of a thermal camera and a manual smoke gun, at the same time as the depressurization air permeability test at both HH-B1 and TF/C-F1 are summarised in Table 4 . An audit of the construction drawings compared to the actual as-built dwellings highlighted in the case of build-type BB-H1 the presence of a service void behind the heat pump, which is not shown on any of the drawings provided by the contractor. Further smoke analysis during the air permeability test identified that the void appeared to not be capped at first floor ceiling level, leading to significant air leakage into the unheated roof-space contributing to the recorded air permeability 8.8 m 3 /h.m 2 . If the local Building Control Officer assigned to this project had been on-site when this test was undertaken during the commissioning of the dwellings this fault should have been identified and rectified before occupancy. As part of the BPE, a comprehensive review of the final design intent data inputs used in the as-built hand-over 2010-SAP were re-calculated, using empirical data from observations of the completed dwellings and also reviewing the construction and commissioning documentation, [14] . These discrepancies include but are not limited to for example; where the 2010-SAP y-value input value of 0.08 for the thermal bridging component of heat loss (representing the default allowable under SAP-2005) where the design is to 'standard accredited construction details' and the contractor "confirms in writing that all junctions conform to such Accredited Construction Details". In the absence of the required evidential paper-trail and/or appropriate H TB calculations for the dwelling or identical; and consistent with the project's empirical evidence that indicates anomalies in the application of the required Construction Details as outlined above; then the default 2010 SAP y-value is 0.15. The use of determined and variant input in the 2014-SAP calculations has impacts on the overall building fabric thermal losses in both monitored build-types, as described in Tables 5 and 6 below: The comparative SAP-analysis undertaken between the 2010 and 2014-SAP indicates a four-fold set of issues between the original final design-intents of the As-built 2010-SAP and the actual-realised As-built post-occupancy in-use 2014-SAP, with varying 'degrees of impact' on the final SAP-outcomes, as follows:
Validation of the actual constructed elements to the original design specifications: the 2009-SAP Convention places an onus to verify the 'quoted' design intent element data, i.e. windows, walls etc.; in the absence of on-site evidence, this would include a review of the manufacture's product information. The differences between the U-values, described above for the external wall construction in build-type BB-H1 for example, between the two SAPs indicates possible misrepresentation within the 2010-SAP.
Validated Building Installation and Commissioning Documentation: in the absence of the documentation relating to the design, construction and final commissioning of the building invalidates both the 2010 and 2014-SAP and is a breach of the statutory requirements including but not limited to the then prevailing Building Regulations. Within the SAP calculations this is illustrated by the thermal Bridge default value as described above.
Invalid SAP-data: for example, the absence of the above documentation for example; compliance with the required Robust Construction Details requires the contractor to confirm in writing that all junctions conform to such Accredited Construction Details, allowing the use of the y-value input value of 0.08 for the thermal bridging component of heat loss recommended under the SAP Conventions 2010. In the absence of the required evidential paper-trail and/or appropriate HTB calculations for the property or identical, then the default 2010 SAP y-value is 0.15 as used in the 2014-SAP calculations. The difference in input values translates to significant difference as illustrated in Tables 5 and 6 above.
Default SAP Input Values: the comparative analysis highlights the variability of selecting default values within the two software versions utilised in the 2010 and 2014-SAP. For the purpose of reporting the 2014-SAP was undertaken with reference to the then prevailing SAP-Conventions, it can only be assumed for the 2010-SAP though evidence further suggests to the contrary.
3.2
Case study two -Top floor flat building fabric performance evaluation Case-study two consists of 20+ affordable homes for rent, designed and constructed to meet ADL1a of the 2010 Building Regulations (England and Wales) to be occupied in 2015. The dwellings are of timber-frame and brick clad construction, within five separate terrace blocks, designed to level 3+ of the CfSH. There is a range of dwelling types, including one storey flats (one bedroom) and two storey houses (with two to three bedroom). The dwellings were reportedly constructed to the applicable Robust Construction details including; for example, the timber floors separating ground and first-floor flats are robust detail E-FT-2, to comply with ADE of the Building Regulations. Space heating is provided by a gas condensing boiler AND Internal ventilation via a Positive Input mechanical system located in the cold-roof 'spaces with a single vent located in either the central passage within the flats or house first-floor landing spaces. Passive ventilation trickle vents are integrally fitted into the opening windowframes.
The target air permeability was 4.00 m³/ (h.m²) at 50 Pascal's (Pa), which meets the minimum to comply with the Welsh Government's (WG) design quality requirements (DQR) at 5 m³/ (h.m²)@50Pa; for dwellings being constructed using WG's social housing grant.
The authors undertook an independent air test on one of the dwellings in November 2014, a first-floor midterrace flat, with a measured air permeability of 5.74m³/ (h.m²)@50 Pascal's, which is below the design air permeability of 6.0m³/ (h.m²) and above the WG's DQR benchmark of 5.0m³/ (h.m²) and lower than the final contractor's air testers determined air permeability of 5.93m³/ (h.m²)@50 Pascal's. The difference between the two reported air permeability's is observed to result from further completion and sealing of potential air pathways in the building fabric, both internally and externally, though still observed to be incomplete during the test undertaken by the authors. A number of discrepancies in the air test methodologies employed by the contactor's tester were observed to contradict those set-out in The Air Tightness Testing & Measurement Association's Technical Standard L1 Measuring Air Permeability of Building Envelopes (Dwellings) October 2010 issue, (ATTMA L1/2010), [15] . Observed non-compliances with the testing standards included:
Non-verification on-site of the building dimensions derived from the supplied construction drawings and calculated off-site. Further, the tester used an 'uncertainty value of '2%' within the software program for building dimensions to calculate the air permeability from the air test results for all observed plots tested, without validation of the uncertainty; Incomplete measurement of external and internal environmental conditions; Incomplete external building fabric such that the test results are not representative of its final completed state None and/or incorrect and/or inappropriate sealing of potential pathways was observed prior to and/or during the air tests conducted on tested plots.
Taken, together, the observed non-compliance by the contractor's air tester with ATTMA TSL1 2010 air testing procedures could potentially invalidate all the (observed) air tightness tests, conducted at the development. The reported observations also have implications for potential compliance with ADL1a of the UK Building Regulations and associated certification. It also raises questions of energy and carbon efficiency of the constructed building fabric.
Due to the observed anomalies and also the air permeability being worse than the design target a combined air tightness test (following the pressurised methodology) and whole dwelling smoke test was conducted. Unwanted air leakage pathways were observed externally to the test flat with smoke escaping from eaves level of the roof (front and rear elevations), a ground floor porch roof and exterior door reveal (one storey below the test flat) and also the boiler flue outlet. Since, the design air permeability target was quite high at 6.0m³/(h.m²)@50Pa it is expected that there would be a number of air leakage pathways from the dwelling; however, these should not be from areas which indicate potential issues with incomplete work described above. Of notable concern, was that smoke was observed to be present within the loft space of the adjacent first floor flat and also in the bathroom of the adjacent ground floor flat, via the wall mounted extractor fan unit. These results could indicate potential problems with the fire separation between these three dwellings, which means they may not comply with ADB, Volume 1 (2010) of the Building Regulations (England and Wales). There is currently no mandatory test required to demonstrate compliance with ADB Vol 1, like there is with ADL1a with an air test. Due to restrictions on site, the other dwellings within the same block as the test flat (two at ground floor and one at first floor) were not accessible at the time of conducting the smoke test, to inspect for any potential smoke penetration within these dwellings. The observed inter-dwelling air leakage pathways could pose potential acoustic, fire and thermal performance irregularities within the final constructed dwellings, and may be derived from a number of factors either individually and/or together including: potential non-attendance by the local government building control officer to approve the installation of measures to prevent fire/smoke spread, potential failure or incorrect in design detailing, potential incorrect execution of construction details, and potential incorrect or faulty installed building components. The findings of the combined air test/smoke test could have implications with respect to both the tested dwelling and the associated dwellings within the same block of dwellings in terms of meeting the necessary Building Standard requirements for certification.
3.3
Case study three -First floor flat building fabric performance evaluation Case-study three as tested in December 2014 is a two-person/one-bedroom, first-floor flat, with two flats per storey over three storeys, with an adjoining block of a further six flats in the same configuration; developed by a UK national contractor.
The terrace block is of traditional brick-block construction, with concrete base ground-floor and concrete beam and block intermediate floors; built to robust details including E-WM-20 for the party walls. Access to each block of six flats, including the test plot, is gained via a common staircase which forms the central area within the terrace block. Each pair of flats share a party wall which extends from the shared landing. There is also a shared party wall to the rear of the dwellings with the second terrace block which forms the residential block. The dwellings consist of an entrance hallway/inter-connecting passageway with a kitchen/lounge, bedroom, and bathroom. Space heating is provided by a gas condensing boiler and internal ventilation via a continuous running vortice mechanical system with local extract fans within the bedroom and kitchen of the dwellings. Trickle vents in the windows and a wall mounted dryer vent in the kitchen were observed in the test flat. The design air permeability of the dwelling is 4.70 m³/ (h.m²) at a pressure of 50 Pascal's; the contractor's air tester determined an air permeability of 4.59 m³/ (h.m²), in late 2014.
Observations of the contractor's air tightness tests were conducted by one of the authors in November 2014, in the test flat and also other flats within the same block, which illustrated a number of discrepancies in the air test methodologies, contradicting those set-out in ATTMA L1/2010, [15] including:
Electrical sockets completely sealed to the walls; Temporary sealing of holes within the seperating walls between flats and means of escape corridor.
An independent air test was undertaken by the authors in December 2014, which recorded an air permeability of 4.92m³/(h.m²)@50 Pascal's; which marginally failed the target design air permeability of 4.70m³/(h.m²), though still passing the WG's DQR benchmark of 5.0m³/(h.m²). The observed difference between the two test values; 4.59 and 4.92m³/(h.m²)@50 Pa may result from the observed non-verification of the on-site as-built envelope area dimensions by the contractor's tester as shown in Table 7 below. Notable, extrapolation of the air permeability difference of 0.36 m³/ (h.m²) for the variation in envelope area of 12.38 m 2 for the reported air permeability value of 4.54 m³/ (h.m²) would derive an 'actual as-built' value of 4.90m³/(h.m²)@50 Pa; indicating that then test flat actually failed the contractor's air test, as result of the measured as-built envelope area difference. This extrapolated observation has further implications for the tested plots within the same block of six flats; which were all tested by the contractor's tester.
Like case study two, due to the observed anomalies and also the air permeability being worse than the design target, a combined air tightness test (following the pressurised methodology) and whole dwelling smoke test was conducted. Unwanted air leakage pathways were observed externally from the test flat escaping from the kitchen tumble dryer vent and mechanical ventilation vent installed within the exterior wall, the bathroom mechanical ventilation vent installed in the ceiling and in the exterior wall. The vents (not the boiler) were temporarily sealed in accordance with ATTMA TSL1 2010, thus the escaping smoke could indicate that the ventilation and boiler vents were not installed correctly through the exterior wall, or that they were potentially faulty. In addition, although the gas boiler was deactivated and is supposed to be a sealed system, smoke was seen to escaping from the flue of this boiler and also that of the boiler in the flat below. Furthermore, in the block of flats where the tests flat is located smoke was present in the roof space and seen to be escaping when the loft hatch in the top floor corridor was opened; the meter cupboards on each floor where smoke was seen to be escaping at the ceiling level; the corridors (leading to the corridor window automatically opening) and also four of the other five flats. The smoke was present in these locations within a matter of minutes. In the adjoining block of flats smoke was present in four out of the six flats and in the other two flats the odour of the smoke was present. In the flats where smoke was present it was observed to be entering the flats from underneath the windows and thus, it appeared from within the cavity, indicating a potential breach of the fire compartmentation between flats and through the party wall between the block of flats.
In both blocks of flats, a number of smoke alarms were not sounding the alarm siren, or the siren was sounding intermittently. These results suggest that there are potential problems with the fire separation between the properties and may mean the minimum requirements for AB, Volume 1 -fire separation and compartmention and fire safety associated with the means of escape are potentially not met.
Similarly to case study two, the observed inter-dwelling air leakage pathways could pose potentially acoustic, fire/smoke and thermal performance irregularities within the final constructed dwellings, and may be derived from a number of factors either individually and/or together including: potential failure in the local government building control officer to attend site during installation of construction components to prevent fire/smoke spread, potential failure or incorrect in design detailing, potential incorrect execution of construction details, and potential incorrect or faulty installed building components. The findings of the combined air test/smoke test could have implications with respect to both the tested dwelling and the associated dwellings within the two blocks of adjoining flats.
Discussion
The three case-studies report the identified issues within the reported Performance Gap between the Design intentions and the actual constructed as-built building fabric [6] , including: limits of current diagnostic testing regime used to verify the construction of design intents. That testing occurs 'at best' during the 2 nd fix phase of construction provides commercial pressures to ensure that the required outcomes for compliance are met. As a result of these pressures issues of inconsistencies in test guidelines and methodologies and the interpretation of data coupled with short term fixes and improvisations on site contribute potentially to the long-term building fabric failures.
On-site quality assurance issues impact significantly on the construction processes in the delivery of robust construction details necessary to meet the required building fabric design intents. These may include variability in construction processes between site contractors and trades, failures in on-site management systems in procurement, installation and construction supervision and work scheduling undermining previous phase work compliances, Offsite there are limitations in the robustness of third-party verification and enforcement of the required compliances with regulations and standards; themselves proving to be inadequate in meeting the demands of delivering effective building fabrics which perform to the required energy efficiencies and low-carbon intents. Furthermore, when local government building control officers receive documentation that indicates that robust and accredited construction details will be used they often do not attend site to observe installation of these details; they simply approve the buildings based on these approved and accredited details.
The lack of independency in verification of the actual on-site constructed building fabric is observed in the lack of robustness in the tools used to calculate and certify the as-built building's performance. This is illustrated by limits in determining and using the as-built test data within SAP calculations, with the exception of air-pressure testing, with assumptions for example of; robust construction underestimating thermal bridging and/or 'U'-values of components and constructed elements.
Overall the 'Performance Gap' is best described as a 'Knowledge Gap' between off-site designers and on-site constructors and within both the policy makers and administrators, including local government building control officers. The cost in not addressing this knowledge gap is observed as not only in the weaknesses of constructed building fabrics to increase energy efficiencies and reduce carbon emissions, but has both operation and associated fiscal impacts for both the owners and occupants of these dwellings. Perhaps the greatest catalyst to the change need is that the observed potential failures in the building fabric have the potential to make the occupation of these dwellings unsafe due to smoke and fire penetration. This is contrary to any certification, with potential regulatory implications if such constructed building fabric failures were proven to be a contributing factor. However, without a mandatory test, such as using air tightness testing combined with whole-dwelling smoke tests to demonstrate compliance with ADB Vol 1, the results observed in the case studies discussed and illustrated may occur in every other dwelling that has been built in the UK with robust and accredited construction details; particularly those where the local government building control officers have used these details to approved compliance rather than attending site when the details are constructed.
Thus, it is pertinent from the observations reported herein to quote in summary the Evidence Review Report conclusion on diagnostic testing in demonstrating fabric performance that "the development of appropriate testing, measuring and assessment techniques is urgently required to enable the '2020 Ambition' to be demonstrated" [6] . A study conducted under the umbrella by TightVent Europ on building air tightness testing [16] demonstrated that where informed quality management [iQM] was used during the construction processes, third-party testing results indicated that airtightness was both better and more predictable. Outcomes could be attributed to extra care given to the design and execution of building details. This adds further evidence to support the use of in-construction testing, using a range of tools including air tightness testing, combined with smoke tests and also thermography; as already promoted by other researchers; to reduce instances of the performance gap and its impacts upon occupant safety and comfort, energy costs and carbon emissions [8; 9; 16; 18 -20] .
For example, evaluating the impact of air tightness testing only means there is limited up to-date fiscal data available to evaluate the cost of undertaking remediation works for dwellings that had failed to achieve the required air test air permeability. A UK study in 2006 [17] indicated a cost in the region of £1,200 per dwelling based on the study's tested dwellings, excluding the re-test cost. This appears to concur with the estimated costs savings of 1,500€ per dwelling reported in the study of air testing of dwellings in France, which were constructed under the iQM management system [16] .
The authors note that whilst, combining whole dwelling smoke testing with air tightness testing is a recognised methodology for illustrating unwanted air leakage pathways [18] it is not a mandatory or compliance test methodology for demonstrating non-compliance with potential smoke spread under ADB. However, the evidence from this paper suggests that a mandatory compliance test methodology should be approved in addition to mandatory attendance of local government building control officers when testing occurs and also when accredited and robust details are installed. This is so that housing developers and contractors have to demonstrate compliance with the requirements to prevent the spread of smoke between dwellings and into means of escape.
Finally, following the reporting of the tests results in the case studies above, the social housing provider has enhanced its development site inspection processes and also they have funded the remediation works to rectify the building fabric defects in case study one. In addition, to co-funding (with the contractor) the replacement of the existing fire alarm system with that of a double-knock fire alarm system in the flats and this type of system will be specified on all its other new development sites.
Conclusions
The findings presented from the three case studies discussed above illustrate that they concur with the Zero Carbon Hub's summarization of the 'Performance Gap' between the Design and As-built dwellings. Verification and testing of construction processes has significant limitations, inconsistent test methodologies and inadequate guidelines for data interpretation; impacting significantly on quality assurance, certification and building efficiency in the delivery of design intents. Further, as the three case studies highlights these impacts go further than the SAP assessed energy and carbon performance of dwellings; with significant implications for both the occupants and owners of the dwellings. There is an identified potential for detrimental occupant behaviour's due to the poor overall building performance resulting in potential fuel poverty and, health and wellbeing implications. For the owner's; impacts on the fiscal viability and operational best practices could be overshadowed where negligence in due diligence and care responsibilities arising from the occupation of dwellings where constructed building fabric issues may contribute to negligence. This paper has reported these issues of building fabric performance within the public sector provision of social housing in South Wales, UK.
Compliance testing whilst observed to occur at or after the second fix stage of construction; evidence, as presented in this paper, suggests that limited as-built test data is actual used in SAP calculations and thereby certification. Thermography studies and air tightness testing, both with smoke testing, and in-situ (heat flux) testing provide the basic on-site tools to evaluate the potential performance of the As-built building fabric against the original design intents and compliance requirements.
It is suggested that there is a need for a mandatory compliance test methodology during the construction stage of dwellings that housing developers and contractors have to demonstrate compliance with the requirements to prevent the spread of smoke between dwellings and into means of escape. This adds further evidence to support the use of in-construction testing, using a range of tools including air tightness testing, combined with smoke tests and also thermography; as already promoted by other researchers; to reduce instances of the performance gap and its impacts upon occupant safety and comfort, energy costs and carbon emissions.
Furthermore, it is discussed that without a mandatory test, such as using air tightness testing combined with whole-dwelling smoke tests to demonstrate compliance with ADB Vol 1, the results observed in the case studies discussed and illustrated may occur in every other dwelling that has been built in the UK with robust and accredited construction details; particularly those where the local government building control officers have used these details to approved compliance rather than attending site when the details are constructed.
